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Unit-train rates for grain and rate deregulation have  resulted in a
dramatic restructuring of the  elevator industry.  Excess  trainloading
capacity was created as  many elevators expanded trackage,  throughput, and/or
storage  to capture favorable unit-train rates.  This excess capacity  led to
mergers, liquidations, and creative pricing policies including  differential
pricing, the practice  of charging different prices or margins to  different
patrons.  Differential pricing is  feasible as  long as  patronage can  be  kept
separate and can be based on costs  (marginal cost pricing) or differences in
demand.
As  elevators  compete more vigorously  for the patronage of some patrons
(i.e.,  large-volume or fringe-area) differences in demand arise.  Elevators
have strong incentives to attract additional volume  because substantial
economies of size exist.  Once a  facility is  constructed, total average costs
are almost entirely a  funtion of volume because even costs normally
classified as  variable react  like fixed costs  to changes in  volume.
Increasing output from 20  to  50  trains per year reduced average fixed costs
and average variable costs  by  60%  and 57%,  respectively.
Fifty  trainloading cooperative elevators were surveyed to determine
their pricing policies.  Only 20%  of the  cooperatives  used differential
pricing between patrons of different volumes,  54%  did to  top off a  unit train,
and 56%  used this practice  between producers and elevators.  Differential
pricing policies were used by more elevators for single-car versus unit-train
receiving stations and between off-rail and unit-train receiving stations,
with 82%  and 95%,  respectively, employing this practice.  In markets where two
or more elevators are competing, farmer patrons  can receive higher net prices
for their grain if  the cooperative uses differential pricing to  increase
volume.  However, if  differential prices are not used, remaining patrons will
receive  lower net prices and the cooperative may  be forced to  merge or
liquidate  because of lower throughput.
iiiPRICING  SYSTEMS OF  TRAINLOADING COUNTRY ELEVATOR COOPERATIVES:  A SUMMARY
David W. Cobia  and Randal  C. Coon*
Excess  capacity  among  trainloading  country  elevators  has  created
interest  in  the  variety  of  pricing  practices  by  trainloading  country  elevator
cooperatives.  This  report  is  a  summary  of  a  studyl  initiated  to  relate
relevant  theoretical  considerations  to  pricing  policies  in  the  economic
environment  in  which  they  compete,  to  identify  pricing  policies  employed,  and
to  estimate  their  impact.
Historical  Framework
Country  elevators  in  the  Upper  Midwest  were  originally  built along
railroads  about  7  to  14  miles  apart  to  accommodate  the  distance  a  horse-drawn
grain  wagon  could  travel  in  a  day.  Country  elevator  numbers  apparently  peaked
in  the  early  1920s.  The  advent  of  trucks  and  improved  roads  expanded  the
distance  a  producer  could  travel,  significantly  reduced  delivery  cost  per
bushel  mile,  and  correspondingly  increased  the  market  area  of  grain  elevators.
Market  areas  of  previously  geographically  isolated  elevators  now  overlapped
each  other  and  created  new  competitive  pressures.  Relatively  small
differences  in  bid  prices  at  distant  elevators  were  sufficient  incentives  for
farmers  to  bypass  local  country  elevators.  Expanded  on-farm  and  off-farm
storage  built  under  incentives  from  government  programs  added  to  excess
capacity  as  benefits  from  these  programs  fluctuated.
Unit  train  rates  for  grain,  initiated  in  1967,  and  later  rate
deregulation  prompted  a  dramatic  restructuring  of  the  elevator  industry.  By
shipping  25,  50,  75,  or  100  cars  from  one  origin  to  one  destination,  railroads
realized  substantial  cost  economies  which  were  reflected  in  the  rail  rate
structure  (Table  1).  These  savings  were  passed,  in  part,  to  shippers  in  the
form  of  higher  prices  as  elevators  tried  to  increase  their  volume.  Many
elevators  rapidly  expanded  trackage,  throughput,  and  often  storage  to  capture
these  economies  (Table  2).  In  several  areas  unit  trainloading  capacity  far
outstripped  demand  for  such  services.  During  this  same  time  railroads  were
abandoning  many  of  their  branch  lines,  leaving  elevators  on  them  without  rail
service.  Exploding  export  demand  for  grain  and  oilseeds  during  the  1970s
mitigated  the  adjustment  process.  Then,  with  the  deterioration  of  export
demand,  the  country  elevator  industry  was  left with  acute  excess  capacity.
The  problem  appears  to  be  acute  in  Iowa  where  an  estimated  5.8  bushels  of
throughput  capacity  exists  for  every  bushel  of  major  grains  shipped  out  of  the
state  (Table  3).
*Cobia  is  professor  and  Coon  is  research  specialist,  Department  of
Agricultural  Economics,  North  Dakota  State  Univ.,  Fargo.
1The  complete  report,  "Pricing  Systems  of  Trainloading  Country
Elevators,"  Agr.  Econ.  Report  No.  214,  can  be  obtained  from  the  Dept.  of  Agr.
Econ.,  NDSU,  Fargo,  ND,  58105  and  Agricultural  Cooperative  Service,  U.S.  Dept.
of  Agriculture,  Washington,  DC,  20250.- 2-
TABLE  1.  COST  SAVINGS  OF  26-  AND  52-CAR
UNIT-TRAIN  RATES OVER SINGLE-CAR
RATES FROM  MINOT, NORTH  DAKOTA, TO
THE  PACIFIC NORTHWEST, JANUARY  1982
Origination  26-Car  52-Car
(  - - /cwt-  - -)
Single  26  49
Multiple  19
TABLE 2.  NUMBER OF  ELEVATORS  WITH
MULTI-CAR LOADING FACILITIES BY  LOADOUT
CAPACITY  FOR SELECTED  STATES, 1984
Loading Capacity  (Cars/Day)
State  24-27  50-54  >75  Total
Iowa  94  52  46  192
Minnesota  52  19  21  92
Nebraska  71  73  23  167
North  Dakota  67  26  0  93
Total  284  170  90  544
Excess  capacity  is  not  nearly  as  severe  in  North  Dakota  (2.3),  in  part
because  unit-train  rates  were  introduced  at  a  later  date  (1980).  It  is also
more  difficult  to  assemble  unit  trains  in  North  Dakota  because  production
density  is  only  1/5  that  of  Iowa  (Table  3)  and  North  Dakota  is  faced  with  a
variety  of  crops  that  require  quality  segregation  in  the  marketing  system.
Large  trainloading  facilities,  thirsty  for  volume  to  cover  fixed  costs,
have  engaged  in  vigorous  price  competition.  These  radical  changes  have  led  to
mergers  and  liquidations--a  general  restructuring  of  the  industry  that  is
still  in  progress.  Continued  depressed  demand  with  accompanying  excess
capacity  has  created  an  environment  with  incentives  for  differential  pricing.- 3  -
TABLE 3.  PRODUCTION  DENSITY  AND  RATIO OF  TRAINLOADING
CAPACITY  TO  INTERSTATE  GRAIN SHIPMENTS OF  THREE MAJOR
GRAINS1 FOR  IOWA,  NEBRASKA, AND  NORTH  DAKOTA, 1985
Item  Iowa  Nebraska  North  Dakota
Production  density,
bu/square  mile  36,867  15,487  8,097
TrainloadinU  capacity,
million  bu 2   2,956  2,536  1,052
Interstate  shipments  by
rail  and  truck,
million  bu 3   507  475  454
Ratio  5.83  5.34  2.32
1Iowa:  corn,  soybeans,  & oats;  Nebraska:  corn,  sorghum,
& wheat;  North  Dakota:  wheat,  sunflower,  &  barley.
2 Assumes  two  trains  per  week  and  3,333  bu/car.
3Estimated  for  Iowa  and  Nebraska  from  various  U.S.
Department  of  Agricultural  Statistical  Reports  and
interstate  shipping  shares  from  Leath  and  Hill,  and
actual  data  for  North  Dakota  provided  by  the  Upper  Great
Plains  Transportation  Institute.
Theoretical  Framework
Average  cost  pricing  has  been  the  dominant  pricing  policy  of  the
country  grain  industry.  Differential  pricing  has  become  more  prominent  in
this  mature  industry  with  the  advent  of  acute  excess  loadout  capacity.
Differential  pricing  is  offering  price  premiums  to  different  groups  or  classes
of  patronage.  Examples  are  harvest  versus  nonharvest,  small  versus  large,
near  versus  distant,  or  producer  versus  elevator  patrons.
Different  marginal  costs  and  different  demands  are  two  theoretical
justifications  for  differential  prices.  Marginal  cost  pricing  is  based  on  the
different  costs  of  providing  services  to  different  classes  of  patronage.  It
is  in  harmony  with  the  cooperative  principle  of  service  at  cost  and  is  legal.
It  is  also  relatively  easy  to  rationalize  to  patrons,  although  it  is  often
unpopular  among  them.  The  idea  is  to  price  the  service  so  that  equal  margins
exist  for  all  patrons.  If  it  costs  3S/bu  less  to  service  one  group  of
patrons,  then  that  cost  difference  should  be  reflected  in  a price  premium,
thus  maintaining  the  business  at  cost  principle.
Differential  prices  based  on  different  demands  is  more  difficult  to
justify  and  explain  to  patrons.  The  legal  basis  hinges  on  the  need  to  meet
competitive  pressures.  That  is,  the  cooperative,  in  order  to  compete  for
volume,  must  offer  premiums  to  match  those  offered  by  competitors.  But  even
this  requirement  need  not  concern  cooperatives  if  they  give  differential- 4-
patronage  refunds  so  that  the  final  price  for  service  is  at  cost  for  each
patronage  group.
Differences  in  demand  arise  when  one  group  of  patrons  (e.g.,
market-area  fringe  versus  nearby  patrons  or  large  versus  small  transactions)
has  more  alternatives  than  another.  The  elevator  would  need  to  offer  the
fringe  or  large-volume  patrons  a  premium  over  the  nearby  or  small-volume
patrons  to  attract  their  patronage  from  competing  elevators.  There  is  an
economic  incentive  even  for  cooperatives  and  patrons  not  receiving  a  premium.
It  is  the  resultant  lower  average  cost  to  all  patrons.  For  example,  patrons
near  the  elevator  would  benefit  from  lower  average  costs  resulting  from
increased  volume  associated  with  a  more  favorable  price  being  given  to  patrons
at  the  fringe  of  the  elevator's  market.
The  question  "Are  additional  benefits  greater  than  additional  costs?"
should  be  asked  when  considering  differential  pricing.  Differential  prices
should  not  be  used  if  costs  of  administering  the  program  exceed  the  benefits.
Such  a  program  would  be  a  nuisance  without  significant  benefits.  Differential
prices  may  not  be  appropriate  when  a  majority  of  members,  including
large-volume  members,  do  not  want  them  and  when  the  competitive  environment
does  not  require  them.
Economies  of  Size  (Trainloading  Facilities)
A  1982  economic-engineering  study  by  Schnake  and  Stevens  that  generated
synthetic  economies-of-size  costs  for  trainloading  facilities was  updated  to
illustrate  standardized  economies  of  size  at  different  locations  with
different  levels  of  utilization.  This  report  was  uniquely  qualified  because
it  localized  costs  for  relevant  states.  It  included  costs  for  unit
trainloading  facilities and  contained  a detailed  breakdown  of  capital
investments  and  fixed  and  variable  costs.  Price  indices  were  generated  to
update  each  cost  component.
Costs  were  generated  for  25-,  50-,  75-,  and  100-car  loadout  facilities
operating  at  20,  35,  and  50  trains  per  year  in  Iowa,  Minnesota,  Nebraska,  and
North  Dakota.  Elevators  for  each  of  these  locations  were  site  specific  in
that  they  represented  typical  crop  combinations  and  cost  structures  for  each
state.  Economies  of  size  feasible  in  trainloading  cooperative  elevators  in
Iowa,  Minnesota,  Nebraska,  and  North  Dakota  are  illustrated  in  Table  4.
Average  costs  decline  8.804/bu  (43%)  and  3.370/bu  (28%)  as  utilization
increases  from  20  trains  per  year  in  15-train  increments  to  50  trains  per
year.  These  savings  present  powerful  incentives  to  increase  throughput  in
order  to  cover  fixed  costs  and  lower  variable  costs.
An  intriguing  observation  was  that  average  variable  costs  react  much
the  same  way  to  changes  in  volume  as  average  fixed  costs  (i.e.,  until  capacity
constraints  are  reached).  Average  fixed  costs  declined  7.91&/bu  (60.0%)  and
variable  costs  declined  4.26&/bu  (56.7%)  as  utilization  is  increased  from  20
to  50  cars  per  year  (Table  4).  The  additional  cost of  handling  an  additional
delivery  approaches  zero.  Average  total  costs  are  therefore  extremely
sensitive  to  volume  so  long  as  excess  capacity  exists.  This  creates
considerable  incentive  to  increase  volume  because  of  the  impact  on  average
costs.  Creative  pricing  and  other  policies  to  increase  volume  are  to  be
expected.-5-
TABLE 4.  ESTIMATED  AVERAGE COST
FOR A 50-CAR  LOADOUT  ELEVATOR,
THREE  LEVELS  OF  UTILIZATION,
IOWA,  1984
Cost  Trains  Per Year
Component  20  35  50
(- - - -I/bu-  - - -)
Fixed  13.18  7.53  5.27
Variable  7.51  4.36  3.25
Total  20.69  11.89  8.52
Survey  of  50  Selected  Trainloading  Cooperatives
Iowa  and  Nebraska  were  identified  as  states  having  some  of  the  most
acute  problems  with  excess  loadout  capacity.  North  Dakota  was  included  as  a
contrast  because  unit  train  rates  were  introduced  later  and  the  industry  did
not  appear  to  be  seriously  overbuilt.  Cooperatives  to  be  interviewed  were
selected  from  a  complete  list  of  trainload  shippers  in  each  state.  They  were
selected  on  the  basis  of  variety  and  number  of  patrons,  satellite  stations,
and  possible  variety  in  pricing  policies.  Officers  of  the  federated
cooperatives  and  banks  for  cooperatives  operating  in  these  states  nominated
cooperatives  for  inclusion.  Major  topics  included  in  the  survey  were:
Competition  (distance  & pricing  policies)
Awareness  of  & attitude  toward  pricing  policies
Co-ops  & nonco-ops  compared
Shipping  practices  (destinations,  railroads,  contracts)
Estimated  handling  cost  & economies  of  size
Impact  of  differential  pricing  & future  prospects
Organizational  structure
Changes  in  facilities  (recent  &  expected)
Gross  margins
Differential  pricing  practices
Policies  toward  small-  and  large-volume  producers
Criteria  for  distribution  of  net  savings
Of  the  50  interviews  conducted  24  were  in  Iowa,  14  in  Nebraska,  9  in
North  Dakota,  and  3  in  Southwestern  Minnesota.  The  three  elevators  in
Minnesota  were  grouped  with  Iowa  because  operating  environment  was  similar.
Cooperatives  selected  for  the  survey  had  relatively  large  trainloading
throughput  and  storage  capacity,  and  a  variety  of  patrons  and  satellite
receiving  stations  because  they  were  selected  on  these  criteria  (Tables  5  to
7).  One  cooperative  had  six  trainloading  facilities with  a  total  loadout
capacity  of  300  cars  per  day  and  23.6  million  bushels  of  storage.  Separate
cooperatives  had  20  elevator  patrons,  9  single-car  and  11  off-rail  receiving-6-
TABLE  5.  FREQUENCY  DISTRIBUTION  OF THE  NUMBER OF
INDEPENDENT ELEVATOR  PATRONS AND  RECEIVING STATIONS
OWNED  BY  50  SELECTED  TRAINLOADING COOPERATIVES,
1985
Independent  Receiving  Stations  Owned
Elevator  Patrons  Train-
Frequency  Co-op  Nonco-op  loading  Raill  Off-Rail
(  - - - number  of  cooperatives  - - - -)
0  22  29  0  28  32
1  2  5  29  11  10
2  6  10  16  5  3
3  4  3  2  2  2
4  4  0  1  1  0
5  2  2  1  0  2
6-8  6  0  1  1  0
9-12  3  1  0  2  1
20  1  0  0  0  0
1Nontrainloading  rail  shippers.
stations.  The  smallest  cooperative  had  .65  million  bushels  of  storage  and  a
50-car  per  day  loadout  capacity.  Several  cooperatives  had  none  of  these  types
of  patrons  and/or  satellite  stations.  The  number  of  producer  patrons  averaged
TABLE 6.  STORAGE CAPACITY  OF  50  SELECTED
TRAINLOADING COUNTRY  ELEVATOR COOPERATIVES, BY
STATE,  1985
State
Storage  Iowa  &
Capacity  Minnesota  Nebraska  North  Dakota  Total
(  MM  bu  )  (  - - ---  - - -number-  - - - - - - - )
<  1  0  0  3  3
1  - 1.5  6  1  1  8
1.5  - 2.5  8  2  3  13
2.5  - 5.0  5  7  2  14
5.0  - 10.0  5  3  0  8
>  10.0  3  1  0  4
Total  9  14  27  50- 7-
TABLE  7.  AVERAGE DISTANCE TO  THE THREE NEAREST
MAJOR COMPETITORS,  50  SELECTED  COOPERATIVE
ELEVATORS,  BY  STATE,  1985
Closest  State
Major  Iowa  &
Competitor  Minnesota  Nebraska  North  Dakota  Total
(  - - - - - - - -miles-  - - - - - - -
First  8  16  19  12
Second  15  27  36  22
Third  18  38  50  30
1,208  and  ranged  from  250  to  4,061.  Average  storage  and  trainloading  capacity
and  distance  to  nearest  competition  reflects,  in  part,  density  of  production.
North  Dakota  elevator  storage  capacity  was  smaller  and  was  more  distant  from
nearest  competitors.  North  Dakota  also  had  less  excess  loadout  capacity.
Considerable  variation  in  estimated  gross  margins  by  crops  were
reported  (Table  8).  Margins  were  generally  lower  in  states  where  the
respective  crop  was  dominant.  Normally  per  unit  costs  are  lower  for
high-volume  grain  than  for  minor  grains.
Use  of  differential  pricing  among  patrons  and  delivery  stations  varied
considerably  (Table  9).  Only  10  (20%)  of  the  50  cooperatives  sometimes  used
differential  prices  between  producer  patrons  of  different  sizes.  At  the  other
extreme,  95%  used  differential  pricing  on  grain  received  at  rail  versus
off-rail  stations.
This  range  in  use  of  differential  prices  reflected  both  the  magnitude
of  savings  and  difficulty  of  determining  marginal  cost.  Double  handling  and
additional  trucking  expense  associated  with  grain  received  at  satellite  (rail
and  off-rail)  stations  are  relatively  significant  and  unambiguous.  Therefore,
differential  pricing  was  more  widespread  in  these  situations.  Only
large  over  small  transactions.  Economies  for  large  truck  deliveries  and
transactions  were  next  at  7%  and  6%,  respectively.  Even  in  these  cases  the
absolute  level  of  estimated  savings  was  less  than  0.2&/bu  and  relative  to
the  price  of  the  commodity;  it  can  only  be  measured  in  1/lOOths  of  a
percent.  Estimates  of  total  savings  from  handling  single  transactions  of
100,000  bushels  amounted  to  only  0.6  of  a cent  per  bushel  or  $600  for  the
entire  transaction.
Managers  were  unable  to  support  these  estimates  with  cost  data.  It  is
apparent  that  they  feel  these  cost  differences  are  insignificant  and/or  such
costs  are  difficult  to  determine.  Perceptions  apparently  are  what  influence
pricing  policies.  The  practice  of  issuing  differential  patronage  refunds  to
patrons  receiving  favorable  prices  surfaced  infrequently.  One  elevator,  for
example,  gave  cooperative  elevator  patrons  1/3  the  regular  refund.  Some
elevator  patrons  received  none.  This  is  equivalent  to  nonmember  business.-8-
TABLE  8.  ESTIMATED  GROSS MARGINS  OF 50  SELECTED
COOPERATIVE  ELEVATORS, BY  STATE,  1985
State
Commodity/  Iowa  &
Statistic  Minnesota  Nebraska  North  Dakota  Total
S--  - - - ----- - -/bu-  ----------
Corn:
Average  7.8  9.9  10.4  8.7
Range  4-13  5-17  10-12  4-17
Soybeans:
Average  12.6  19.5  12.5  14.6
Range  8-25  8-25  8-20  8-25
Wheat:
Average  13.3  14.6  10.5  12.9
Range  12-15  9-22  7-15  7-22
Impacts  of  Differential  Pricing
Eventual  impacts  of  differential  pricing  as  practiced  by  cooperative
elevators  will,  of  course,  be  a  function  of  changes  in  demand  and  resultant
level  of  excess  capacity,  competition,  member  attitudes,  qualification  of
management,  differences  in  cost  structure,  and  premerger  commitments.
Justification  for  differential  prices  arises  from  an  ability  to  separate
patrons  and  differences  in  marginal  cost  and/or  differences  in  demand.
Difference  in  costs  between  different  types  of  deliveries  and  transactions  for
TABLE 9.  DIFFERENTIAL PRICING  BETWEEN CATEGORIES OF  PATRONS  BY  SELECTED GRAIN
MARKETING COOPERATIVES  IN  IOWA, MINNESOTA, NEBRASKA, &  NORTH  DAKOTA, 1985
Single-  vs.
To  Top  Multiple-Car  Farmers
Large-vs.  Small-Volume  Off  Unit  Rail  vs.  Receiving  vs.
Use  Producers  Transactions  Train  Off-Raill  Station?  Elevator
(  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - percent  - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Never  80  62  46  5  18  44
Sometimes  20  30  50  28  14  32
Always  0  0  4  67  68  24
(-  - - - - - - - - - - - - - -number-  - - - - - - - - - - - - - )
Cooperatives  50  50  50  18  22  50
INot  all  elevators  had  off-rail  and  single-car  receiving  stations.-9  -
grain-marketing  first-handlers  appears  to  be  insignificant.  Therefore,
differential  prices  must  be  based  on  differences  in  demand.  Elevator
cooperatives  pressured  by  competition  to  use  differential  prices  face  a
dilemma  with  possible  unpleasant  consequences  unless  they  also  return
differential  patronage  refunds  in  order  to  maintain  the  business-at-cost
principle  that  cooperatives  practice.  Differential  prices  based  on  cost
differences  are  easy  to  justify,  explain,  and  understand.  But  prices  based  on
differences  in  demand  are  not  as  easy  to  rationalize  and  appear  to  violate  the
business-at-cost principle.
The  only  justification for  giving  large-volume  deliveries  and
transactions  a  premium  is  the  resultant  impact  on  average  costs.  In  this  case
small-volume  patrons  will  be  better  off  even  though  the  business-at-cost
principle  has  been  compromised  because  both  average  fixed  and  variable  costs
would  be  significantly  lower.  As  explained  above,  the  business-at-cost
principle  need  not  be  compromised.
Boards  can  resolve  the  dilemma  by
1.  not  giving  premiums  or  using  uniform  prices;
2.  giving  minor  premiums  based  on  cost  savings,  thus  preserving
business-at-cost  principle  and  equal  margins  for  patronage  refunds;
or
3.  offering  premiums  larger  than  cost  savings  in  order  to  attract
volume  and  give  differential  patronage  refunds  or  count  such
business  as  nonmember  business.
Patrons  receiving  favorable  prices  and  whose  patronage  is  classified  as
nonmember  business  forfeit  any  right  to  patronage  refunds.  They  have  already
received  benefits  in  the  form  of  favorable  prices.  But  this  practice  would
create  a  problem  of  equity  generation.  The  problem  could  be  circumvented  if
the  cooperative  generated  equity  with  per  unit capital  retains,  a  common
source  of  equity  among  fruit and  vegetable  cooperatives  but  rare  among  grain
cooperatives.
Farmers
Trainload  shippers  are  motivated  to  offer  premiums  to  large-volume
patrons  by  competitive  pressures,  lower  per  unit fixed  costs  resulting  from
added  volume,  and  the  lower  cost  of  handling  large-volume  transactions  and
deliveries.  Only  20%  of  the  elevators  sometimes  offered  differential  prices
to  their  farmer  patrons  on  basis  of  size  (Table  9),  none  of  them  on  a
regular  basis.  These  premiums  were  given  more  in  response  to  competitive
pressures  than  on  perceived  differences  in  handling  costs  (Table  10).
Therefore,  loss  in  volume  to  cover  costs  loomed  as  the  primary  motivation  for
differential  prices.  The  need  for  timely  delivery  to  cover  a short  or  to  top
off  a  unit  train  was  also  a  factor.
What  perceived  cost differentials  that  did  exist were  insignificant and
were  not  supported  by  cost  data.  Therefore,  managers  were  not  in  a  position
to  post  differential  prices  because  there  was  no  cost  basis  on  which  to  base
them.- 10  -
TABLE  10.  AVERAGE VARIABLE  GRAIN  HANDLING COSTS AND
SAVINGS  UNDER SPECIFIED CONDITIONS AS  ESTIMATED BY
MANAGERS OF  50  SELECTED COOPERATIVE COUNTRY
ELEVATORS,  1985
Handling  Variable  Savings  of  Large  Over  Small 1
Item  Cost  Producer  Truck  Transaction2
(  - - - - - - - -/bu-  - - - - - - - )
Receiving  3.3  .05  .23  .20
(1,5)  (7.0)  (6.0)
Conditioning  1.7  .01  .02  .03
(0.5)  (1.2)  (1.7)
Selling  1.3  .02  .02  .15
(1.5)  (1.5)  (11.5)
Drying  1.8  .00  .00  .00
IMidpoints  of  ranges  were  used  to  calculate  the
averages.  Number  in  parentheses  is  savings  as  a
percent  of  variable  cost.
2Weighted  average  of  estimated  savings  from  a  100,000
bu  transaction  =  0.60/bu.
SOURCE:  Cobia,  et al.
The  apparent  impact  of  differential  pricing  will  be  another  disadvantage
faced  by  the  small-volume  patrons;  their  economic  position  is  eroded.  But
this  is  a  short-sighted  and  misguided  view.  The  long-run  position  of  a
small-volume  member  will  be  enhanced  by  giving  volume  premiums.  With
differential  prices  the  cooperative  will  operate  with  greater  volume  and  lower
costs.  Small-volume  members  therefore  receive  a  higher  net  price.  With
persistent  use  of  uniform  prices,  the  cooperative  loses  volume  to  competitors
and  average  costs  increase.  Small-volume  members  receive  lower  net  price  as  a
result.  A  forced  merger  or  liquidation  of  their  cooperative  may  also  take
place.
In  most  competitive  markets,  policies  of  cooperatives  will  have  limited
net  effect  on  farmers.  Because  of  competition,  changes  will  take  place
regardless  of  cooperative  pricing  policies.  Nevertheless,  if  the  more
numerous  small-volume  members  insist  on  uniform  prices,  they  will  drive
large-volume  members  to  elevators  that  will  pay  the  premiums  and  will  thus
leave  their  own  elevator  operating  at  a  much  lower  capacity  and  higher  cost.
As  a  result,  small-volume  patrons  will  be  in  worse  condition  than  before  or  in
worse  condition  than  if  a  premium  had  been  offered  to  the  large-volume
patrons.  Therefore,  even  small-volume  patrons  should  support  properly
conceived  premiums  based  on  volume.  The  resultant  higher  volume  would  help
cover  fixed  costs  and  thereby  improve  patronage  refunds  and  prolong  the  useful
life  of  the  cooperatives.- 11  -
Patrons  located  near  satellite  stations  may  experience  a  slight
relative  decline  in  the  value  of  their  land.  Trucking  costs  to  more  distant
delivery  points  will  be  higher.  These  factors  eventually  get  capitalized  into
land  values.  Patrons'  concern  over  keeping  satellite  stations  open  is
therefore  understandable.
Pricing  differentials  of  country  elevators  based  entirely  on  cost
differences  between  deliveries  and  transactions  of  different  sizes  will  be
ineffective  because  cost  differences  are  insignificant.  From  the  producer's
perspective,  other  variables  such  as  interest  and  storage  expense  and  price
risk  overwhelm  any  premiums  that  could  be  offered  strictly  on  the  basis  of
cost.  To  gain  producer  interest,  price  differentials  must  include  a  demand
dimension  as  well  as  a  cost  dimension.
Clearly  defined  criteria  for  price  premiums  will  encourage  patrons  to
change  their  scope  and  method  of  operation  to  capture  these  premiums.  Members
may,  for  example,  change  their  marketing  strategy  by  being  prepared  to  sell
more  of  their  grain  at  one  time  to  take  advantage  of  favorable  prices  offered
for  a  large  transaction  or  to  help  top  off  a  unit  train.  Such  an  action  would
require  the  patron  to  be  more  sure  of  his  timing  than  relying  on  such
strategies  as  averaging.  Given  that  premiums  are  offered,  patrons will  have
to  evaluate  the  trade-off  between  several  possible  transactions  in  hopes  of
achieving  a  higher  average  price  versus  the  risk  of  lower  price  and  fewer  but
larger  transactions.  In  the  latter  case,  farmers  could  receive  as  good  a
price  or  better  price;  they  would  just  have  fewer  opportunities.  This  is
another  reason  for  farmers  to  establish  a  carefully  conceived  marketing  plan.
It  is  unlikely  that  differential  prices  or  premiums  for  large-volume
patrons  will  exist  in  geographically  isolated  markets  or  markets  where
cooperatives  are  dominant  such  as  in  western  North  Dakota  and  western
Nebraska.  Economic  incentives  to  do  so  are  limited.  Competitors  are  not,
trying  to  bid  away  large-volume  patrons,  except  on  the  fringe  of  their  market.
Therefore,  premium  must  rest  on  costs.  Cost  differentials  are  unlikely  to
overcome  negative  attitudes  because  the  cost  differences  are  not  as  pronounced
as  in,  for  example,  fuel  delivery,  and  the  differences  have  not  been
documented.
Satellite  Stations
Satellite  stations  will,  with  few  exceptions,  decline  in  use  and  will
in  many  cases  be  eliminated  as  receiving  stations.  Lower  prices  offered  for
delivery  at  these  stations will  help  move  this  structural  change  along.
Differential  pricing  between  main  and  satellite  stations  was  the  most  common
differential  pricing  reported.  Nearly  70%  of  the  elevators  always  used
differentials  in  this  case.  Their  justification  was  to  attract  direct
shipments  to  the  main  station  to  avoid  the  additional  handling  and  freight
costs  of  using  the  satellite  station.
In  contrast  to  cost  differences  between  farmers  of  different  sizes,  the
cost  savings  of  direct  delivery  to  the  main  station  is  obvious  and  easy  to
measure.  Grain  is  handled  more  than  necessary  than  when  delivered  directly  to
a  trainloading  receiving  station.  The  elevator,  rather  than  the  patron,
absorbs  transportation  costs.  Not  only  is  the  grain  handled  an  additional- 12  -
time,  but variable costs  are  generally  higher than at the main  station  because
of  less  efficient equipment.  Most fixed  costs  can  be  ignored because  the
physical  plant  has  typically  been depreciated out and alternative  uses  are
minimal.  It was  the authors' impression that most differential  prices  did  not
fully reflect  these additional  costs.
Failure  to  use  differential  pricing by  21%  of  the elevators  forced
patrons delivering to  the main stations  to  subsidize  those  that deliver  to
satellite  stations.  All  patrons  are  penalized  because  of  the  added  layer  of
costs.
Most  elevators  not  using  differential  prices  at  satellites  do  so
because  of  premerger agreements.  Apparently, during  premerger  negotiations,
explicit or  implied  commitments  were  made  to  members of  the  previously
independent  satellite  cooperatives.  These  commitments  were not only  to keep
the  merging receiving  station  open  but also  to  offer the  same  price as  at  the
main stations.  These agreements  force continued  use  of uniform prices.  This
policy will  only  prolong  the  use  of  these receiving  stations,  make  these
cooperatives  less competitive,  and return  fewer benefits  to  their members.
Managers are employing other  strategies  to  reduce deliveries  to  satellite
stations  such  as  arranging for  on-farm pickup of  grain.
Not  all  satellites  will  fall  into  disuse.  Satellite  receiving  stations
often  provide  relief  during  the  harvest  glut.  Some  satellites  are  also  used
to advantage  for  small  domestic shipments  that cannot use unit-train rates.
The same  rationale  for  the  continued role  of  small  independent cooperatives is
also  relevant  to  satellite stations.
Satellites  can  always  provide  storage.  They  are  more  storage  than
throughput oriented,  and  the  storage  function  has  been enhanced by  government
CCC  storage  programs.  Should  these  programs  change  or  be  eliminated,
satellites  would  be  more  affected  than  throughput-oriented  facilities.
Decline  in  the  use  of  satellite stations  as  receiving  stations  should
take  place  regardless of competitive pressures  because this is  an  internal
matter.  Only  continued  reliance  on premerger agreements  to keep  prices at
the  satellite  uniform will  prolong  their continued  use  as a  receiving  station,
particularly  if  prices reflect true  costs.
Cooperative Trainloading  Elevators
Impacts  of  differential  pricing policies  on  cooperatives  are obscure
and variable.  The  competitive environment, cost structure, and mind  set of
members and manager  all  play  significant roles.  Interaction  of these
variables will  yield a  variety  of results.
Use  of  differential  prices among different classes  of  patrons will
place a cooperative  on a  firm  competitive  foundation--provided  that  prices  are
rationally  based  and  its  basic cost structure  is  relatively low.  Such
cooperatives  will  know  how far  to  go  to  attract the necessary  volume,  when to
let  it  go,  and  how  to  set margins  so  that one  set of  patrons is  not
subsidizing another  set.  These  cooperatives will  be  competitive and be  able
to  maintain volume,  thus  keeping  costs at a minimum.  However,  the  rationale- 13  -
and  data  supporting  multiple  prices  will  have  to  be  clearly  explained  and
understood.  Otherwise,  patrons,  particularly  those  not  receiving  the
premiums,  may  create  adversarial  relationships.  All  patrons,  particularly
voting  members,  have  a  right  to  know  that  they  are  not  being  arbitrarily
discriminated  against.
Cooperatives  that  do  not  offer  differential  prices  in  competitive
markets  will  be  priced  out  of  the  market  and  thus  lose  some  of  their  highest
volume  patrons.  Left  with  low  volume  they  will  operate  with  higher  than
necessary  margins.  Ultimately,  such  elevators  may  be  forced  to  merge  or
liquidate.
In  geographically  isolated  markets,  the  cooperative  will  not  be
bothered  so  much  by  competition  for  large-volume  patrons  and  can  therefore
pursue  an  independent  pricing  policy  based  entirely  on  costs.  These
cooperatives  are  located  in  western  Nebraska  and  western  North  Dakota.  They
will  only  feel  a  challenge  on  their  trade-area  fringe.  Continued  acquiescence
of  large-volume  patrons  to  subsidization  of  small-volume  members  will  likely
persist  because  alternatives  are  limited  and  justification  for  differential
pricing  is  limited.  Large-volume  patrons  would  not  realize  much  of  a
premium.
Managers  of  elevators  observed  that  many  cooperatives  were  in  a
precarious  situation  because  of  their  relatively  high  cost  structure.
Cooperatives  became  enamored  with  elaborate  physical  plants,  pushed  the
construction  of  facilities,  and  purchased  equipment  to  satisfy  a wide  array  of
services  requested  by  members  to  the  extreme.  This  load  of  high  fixed  costs
places  cooperatives  at  a disadvantage  compared  to  noncooperative  elevators.
Many  noncooperative  elevators,  on  the  other  hand,  have  been  able  to  achieve
the  same  throughput  capacity  by  substituting  careful  scheduling  of  receipts
for  large  and  expensive  concrete  storage  silos;  avoiding  costs  of  auxiliary
services;  and  concentrating  on  high-volume  grain  leaving  low-volume  grain,
with  attendant  costs,  to  cooperatives.  As  a result,  these  cooperatives  are
vulnerable  because  noncooperative  elevators  have  a lower  cost  structure  and
greater  pricing  policy flexibility.
Payment  of  a premium  to  cover  a  short when  loading  out  a unit  train
seemed  to  be  a  function  of  operating  policy  and  storage  capacity.  The  speed
and  timeliness  of  relatively  large  deliveries  were  major  reasons  given  for
offering  premiums  to  large-volume  patrons.  Over  one-half  of  the  managers
indicated  they  always  or  sometimes  engaged  in  this  practice.  Generally,  the
premium  was  publicly  posted  and  was  available  to  all  patrons.  Therefore,  this
pricing  policy  is  seen  as  having  a neutral  effect  on  patrons  and  the
competitive  structure.  To  the  extent  that  premiums  are  offered  to  a select
few  (e.g.,  large-volume  patrons),  the  economic  impacts  should  be  similar  to
those  discussed  above  for  differential  prices  for  different  size  patrons.
Several  managers  of  elevators  with  considerable  storage  capacity  inoicated
that  they  always  had  the  grain  on  hand  before  commitments  were  made.
Therefore,  they  never  had  to  attract  grain  with  premiums  to  top  off  a  unit
train.- 14  -
Single-Car  Shipping  Cooperatives
Cooperatives  without  trainloading  facilities  are  not  able  to  attract
grain  directly  for  export  and  for  other  high-volume  shipments.  Their  high-
volume  patrons  could  be bid  away  by  premiums paid  by  trainloading elevators
thirsty  for volume  to  reduce average  costs.  To share  in  the  trainload rates,
single-car  shippers  have  to  transship  grain  to  elevators with trainloading
facilities.  Only  24%  of  the  trainload  shippers extended premium  prices over
what farmers received  to  these elevators;  32%  did  sometimes.
Favorable  prices  (lower margins)  can be  extended  to  single-car shippers
because
1.  delivery  of  relatively  large  shipments is timely,
2.  receiving and  handling costs  are  lower,
3.  interest rates  on  inventory  are  lower, and
4.  grain  is sometimes  blended and ready  for  shipment.
Blending could  be a disadvantage because  it  generally  contributes  to  improved
margins.
An amazing 44%  of  the  trainload  shippers  did  not offer their elevator
patrons a  premium over that  of farmer  members.  It  is  difficult  to  conceive
that such a  policy  can  be maintained  for  long,  particularly in  the face  of
excess  loadout  capacity  and  the advantages of  receiving grain  from an  elevator
rather than  producer patrons.  To the  extent that trainload  shippers  can
persist in  a  uniform pricing  policy,  these elevator  patrons will  be  under
severe market and  financial  pressure.  They  cannot offer  their patrons in  the
market area bordering  the  trainload shipper's  market as  favorable a  price
unless  their merchandising operation  is  subsidized  by  another activity.  These
single-car  shippers are,  in  effect, subsidizing  farmer  shippers  to  the
trainloading  facility.  The  incentive  for  single-car  shippers  to  accept  this
business  is  the  increased  volume  to  cover  their  own  fixed costs.  They  operate
on the  difference in  price  between the  bids  they  can make  on  single-car rates
and bids  from the  trainload  shipper  based  on  unit  train  rates.
This is  a  rather  gloomy  picture  for  single-car shippers.  But several
will  likely  survive, at  least in  the  short run, in  better  financial  position
than their  overbuilt, high-fixed cost trainloading  neighbors.  These  small
elevators  typically  have  fully  depreciated facilities and low  interest
expense.  They  can also  carve  out for  themselves  special  market segments where
they  have a comparative advantage.  Several  domestic markets,  especially  corn,
sorghum, and wheat, cannot accommodate unit-train quantities.  Single-car
shippers are in  just as  good, if  not better,  position  to  service  these  needs.
They also  can pursue  similar markets  for  lower-volume  specialized  crops.
Federated Cooperatives
The  impact of differential  pricing by  trainloading cooperatives on
federated  cooperatives is  indirect.  These policies will  further weaken or
draw business away  from the  federated system.  Large-volume  farmers would be
attracted  to  trainload shippers and away  from single-car  shippers  (traditional
patrons  of  the federated cooperative),  thus  further weakening smaller
cooperatives  traditional  trade  with  the  federated system.- 15  -
Managers  were  uniform  in  their  feelings  that  federated  cooperatives
will  be  forced  into  a  general  retrenchment.  They  need  to  consolidate  by
reducing  overlapping  facilities  and  membership.  Only  1  manager  out  of  50
thought  that  federated  cooperatives  would  become  a  more  dominant  force.
Supporting  these  statements  was  a  major  restructuring  of  two  large  midwestern
federated  grain-marketing  cooperatives  after  this  survey  of  trainload  shippers
was  taken.  Agrilndustries  sold  most  of  its  facilities  and  formed  a  joint
venture  with  Cargill,  a  noncooperative,  with  what  remained.  GrowMark  withdrew
as  an  independent  force  by  forming  a  joint  venture  with  ADM.
Most  of  the  trainload  shippers  did  not  use  a  federated  cooperative  even
though,  as  one  manager  stated,  "We  are  the  largest  equity  holder."  These
trainload  shippers  were  large  enough  to  compete  for  the  same  business.  A  few
of  them  saw  themselves  becoming  federated;  they  averaged  3  cooperatives  as
patrons,  10  had  6  or  more,  and  one  had  20  (Table  5).  Differential  prices  will
simply  augment  this  movement  to  bypass  the  federated  cooperatives  because
prices  offered  by  trainload  shippers  will  often  be  more  than  single-car  prices
offered  by  the  federated  cooperative  affiliates.
The  shift to  bypass  federated  cooperatives  is  more  of  a  fundamental
structural  change  created,  in  the  main,  by  unit  train  rates  than  a  sign  that
federated  cooperatives  have  failed.  Economies-of-size  studies  have,  for
years,  concluded  that  much  larger  and  fewer  elevators  would  return  more
benefits  to  producers.  However,  unit  train  rates  have  forced  the  issue.
These  rates  prompted  the  creation  of  units  with  high  throughput  capacity.
Added  volume  has  made  it  economical  for  many  large  elevators  to  create  their
own  merchandising  departments.  These  departments  often  pride  themselves  in
acquiring  more  favorable  bids  than  those  achieved  by  federated  cooperatives
through  which  they  formally  shipped  their  grain.
Single-car  shippers  continue  to  need  services  provided  by  federated
cooperatives,  but  the  need  will  be  for  a  slightly  different  mix  of  traffic  and
at reduced  volumes.  Federated  cooperatives  could,  and  have  done  so,  take  an
aggressive  role  in  helping  to  rationalize  the  location  of  satellite  stations,
size  and  location  of  trainloading  facilities,  etc.,  and  change  merchandising
policies  to  accommodate  the  realities  of  new  relationships  created  by  unit
train  rates.
Noncooperative  Trainloading  Elevators
Noncooperative  elevators  were  reported  to  have  two  major  advantages
over  cooperatives.  First,  many  noncooperative  elevators  seem  to  be
concentrating  exclusively  on  high-volume  grain  with  low-cost  facilities.
Lower  costs  are  derived  from  lower  overhead  from  less  elaborate  facilities  and
equipment  associated  with  greater  storage  capacity  and  services  that
cooperatives  typically  cover.  Reduced  switching  from  one  grain  to  another
lowers  both  handling  and  merchandising  costs.
Second,  they  have  greater  freedom  in  pricing.  Managers  do  not  have  to
answer  to  a  local  board  of  directors  composed  of  producers.  They  do  not  need
to  worry  about  openness  generally  present  in  a  cooperative.  Therefore,
noncooperative  elevators  can  engage  in  a  wider  variety  of  prices  than
cooperatives;  patrons  even  expect  it.  Managers  of  cooperatives  certainly
thought  it  was  taking  place.  To  the  extent  that  cooperatives  have  a  low-cost- 16  -
structure  and  are  free  to  engage  in  differential  pricing,  they  are  in  a
relatively  favorable  position.
Associated Observations
Availability  of Cost Data
One of  the most disappointing and yet not surprising  findings was  the
lack  of  cost data on which  to  base differential  pricing decisions.  Several
elevators  had detailed  cost information but did  not have it  classified in  a
way  that differential  pricing  policies  could be  defended.  If  accurate  cost
data  is  not available, differential  prices may  not  include  equal  margins.
Members  have a right  to  know  that one  group of  patrons is  not subsidizing
another.
Without accurate  cost data, management
1.  cannot accurately  allocate fixed  costs,
2. may  be  in  violation  of  laws relating  to  differential  prices,
3.  may  violate  the business-at-cost principle, and
4.  may  be  too aggressive in  offering  premiums.
There may  be  some  business  that the  cooperative  should let  the competition
take.
The challenge is  more difficult in  grain marketing  than  in  supplies
such as  fuel  and  feed  because differences in  costs of  serving different
patrons  are  not as  sensitive  to  volume.  Even  so,  excess  loadout  capacity  has
forced  several  cooperatives  to  offer premiums  in  order  to  preserve  their
volume.  But these premiums have  been extended  not knowing  how  far  the
cooperative should go  to be  fair  to  their other members  and  to  contribute to
the  financial  strength of  the cooperative.  Unfortunately, management cannot
wait for good  cost data.  They  have  to react immediately  to  competitive
pressure.
Criteria  for generation of  costs, for  benefits  from  increased volume,
and  for resultant price  differentials  should be  based on  factors which
directly  influence  costs.  Differences  such  as  size of transaction  should  be
used rather than  institutional  factors  such  as whether  the  patron  is  a
producer or  an elevator.  Factors  such as  size of  transaction and timeliness
of deliveries may  often  be,  but not always,  linked with type of  patron.
Producers will  be more likely  to  understand differential  prices if  they  can
see  the  criteria arise  out of  how  costs and  benefits are  generated.  They  can
also  visualize how it  would be  possible  for  them  to  meet the  criteria if  they
changed  their farming  and marketing operations.
Distribution of  Net Income
Net income was  distributed  to  patrons in  four ways,  all  based on  volume
of  business with the  cooperative  (Table 11).  They  were  by  bushels  or monetary
and  by  individual  grain  or a blend.  Managers  using  one approach  seemed
surprised that other  cooperative elevators were using another.  Use of  these
approaches  is  somewhat regionalized.  Nearly  3/4 of  all  cooperatives
distributed  net savings as a blend rather  than  segregating by  crop  (Table 11).- 17  -
TABLE  11.  METHOD OF  DISTRIBUTING  PATRONAGE
REFUNDS  BY  50 SELECTED  COOPERATIVE ELEVATORS,
1985
Method  Bushels  Monetary  Total
(  - - - - percent  - --  -
Individual  grain  18  8  26
Blend  66  8  74
Total  84  16  100
This  practice  raises  questions  about  service  at  cost.  Typically,  one  grain
generates  more  net  savings  than  another.  If  the  cooperative  is  to  operate
with  service  at  cost,  then  refunds  should  be  segregated.  This  is  also  true
for  services  such  as  drying.  Members  may  more  readily  give  up  unprofitable
services  if  patronage  refunds  are  segregated.
There  are  valid  reasons  for  not  segregating  net  savings  by  product  or
service.  Segregation  could  become  a  nuisance  and  not  worth  the  effort.
Members  may  also  consciously  wish  to  have  a blended  allocation  of  net  income.
Premerger  Commitments
Several  managers  were  hamstrung  in  their  pricing  policies at  satellite
stations.  They  were  forced  to  pay  the  same  price  at  these  receiving  stations
as  at  trainloading  stations  by  explicit or  implied  premerger  agreements.
These  commitments  were  apparently  made  to  encourage  members  of  the  merging
station  to  approve  the  merger.
These  concessions  are  not  economical.  All  members,  including  those  to
whom  the  agreements  were  made,  are  penalized.  Average  costs  are  higher
because  of  double  handling,  prices  not  reflecting  the  cost  of  doing  business,
net  savings  being  reduced,  and  the  competitive  position  and  financial  strength
of  the  cooperative  being  compromised.  Many  of  the  benefits  of  the  merger  are
thus  not  realized.  It  is  important  to  avoid  these  kinds  of  commitments  during
merger  negotiations.  Members  need  to  understand  that  location  and  pricing
decisions  will  be  based  on  costs  rather  than  political  considerations.  It  is
then  up  to  management  and  the  board  to  carry  out  such  commitments.- 19  -
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